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Abstract—A secret sharing scheme is a method to store
information securely and reliably. Particularly, in a threshold
secret sharing scheme, a secret is encoded into n shares, such
that any set of at least t1 shares suffice to decode the secret,
and any set of at most t2 < t1 shares reveal no information
about the secret. Assuming that each party holds a share and a
user wishes to decode the secret by receiving information from a
set of parties; the question we study is how to minimize the
amount of communication between the user and the parties.
We show that the necessary amount of communication, termed
“decoding bandwidth”, decreases as the number of parties
that participate in decoding increases. We prove a tight lower
bound on the decoding bandwidth, and construct secret sharing
schemes achieving the bound. Particularly, we design a scheme
that achieves the optimal decoding bandwidth when d parties
participate in decoding, universally for all t1 ≤ d ≤ n. The
scheme is based on a generalization of Shamir’s secret sharing
scheme and preserves its simplicity and efficiency. In addition,
we consider the setting of secure distributed storage where the
proposed communication efficient secret sharing schemes not only
improve decoding bandwidth but further improve disk access
complexity during decoding.
Index Terms—Security, secret sharing, communication band-
width, distributed storage, Reed-Solomon codes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the scenario that n parties wish to store a secret
securely and reliably. To this end, a dealer distributes the secret
into n shares, i.e., one share for each party, such that 1) (relia-
bility) a collectionA ⊂ 2{1,...,n} of “authorized” subsets of the
parties can decode the secret, and 2) (secrecy) a collection B of
“blocked” subsets of the parties cannot collude to deduce any
information about the secret. A scheme to distribute the secret
into shares with respect to access structure (A,B) is called a
secret sharing scheme, initially studied in the seminal works
by Shamir [20] and Blakley [3]. A secret sharing scheme is
perfect if a subset of parties is either authorized or blocked,
i.e., A ∪ B = 2{1,...,n}. A scheme is often referred to as a
ramp scheme if it is not prefect [4]. An important application
of secret sharing schemes is distributed storage of private data,
where each party is a storage node. Besides, secret sharing is a
fundamental cryptographic primitive and is used as a building
block in numerous secure protocols [1].
We focus on secret sharing schemes for the threshold access
structure, i.e., A contains all subsets of {1, ..., n} of size at
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least n − r, and B contains all subsets of {1, ..., n} of size
at most z. In other words, the secret can be decoded in the
absence of any r parties, and any z parties cannot collude to
deduce any information about the secret. Note that a threshold
scheme is perfect if z+r = n−1 since any set of at least n−r
parties are authorized and any set of less parties are blocked.
The scheme is a ramp scheme if z+ r < n−1. The threshold
access structure is particularly important in practice, because
for this case, space and computationally efficient secret sharing
schemes are known. Specifically, Shamir [20] constructs an
elegant and efficient perfect threshold scheme using the idea of
polynomial interpolation. Shamir’s scheme is later shown to be
closely related to Reed-Solomon codes [14] and is generalized
to ramp schemes in [4], [24], [9], which allow better space
efficiency, i.e., rate, than the original perfect scheme. Shamir’s
scheme and the generalized ramp schemes achieve optimal
usage of storage space, in the sense that fixing the size of
the shares, the schemes store a secret of maximum size.
The schemes are computationally efficient as decoding the
secret is equivalent to polynomial interpolation. An example of
Shamir’s scheme is shown in Figure 1. Other threshold secret
sharing schemes and generalizations of Shamir’s scheme may
be found in, e.g., [11], [25], [13], [12]. Recently, there has
been considerable interest in incorporating secrecy into erasure
codes for distributed storage, e.g., [15], [19], [18]. These codes
can also be viewed as threshold secret sharing schemes.
In addition to space and computational efficiency, this
paper studies the communication efficiency for secret sharing
schemes. Consider the scenario that a user wishes to decode
the secret by downloading information from the parties that are
available. Referring to the amount of information downloaded
by the user as the decoding bandwidth, a natural question
is to address the minimum decoding bandwidth that allows
decoding. It is of practical interest to design secret sharing
schemes that achieve a small decoding bandwidth, or in other
words, that require communicating only a small amount of
information during decoding. In such a case, decoding will be
completed in a timely manner and the communication resource
will be more efficiently utilized.
In many existing secret sharing schemes, e.g., [20], [14],
[11], [4], [24], [9], [25], [13], [12], [15], [19], [18], a common
practice in decoding is that the user will communicate with
a minimum set of parties, i.e., exactly n − r parties (even if
d > n−r parties are available) and download the whole share
stored by these parties. Wang and Wong [23] show that this
paradigm is not optimal in terms of communication and that
the decoding bandwidth can be reduced if the user downloads
only part of the share from each of the d > n − r available
parties. Specifically, given d, for any perfect threshold secret
sharing scheme, [23] derives a lower bound on the decoding
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Party 1 Party 2 Party 3 Party 4 Party 5 Party 6 Party 7
f(1) = f(2) = f(3) = f(4) = f(5) = f(6) = f(7) =
m1 +m2 + k1 m1 + 2m2 + 4k1 m1 + 3m2 + 9k1 m1 + 4m2 + 5k1 m1 + 5m2 + 3k1 m1 + 6m2 + 3k1 m1 + 7m2 + 5k1
Fig. 1: Shamir’s scheme (generalized ramp version) for n = 7, r = 4, z = 1, with symbols over F11. The scheme stores a
secret of two symbols, denoted by m1,m2. Let k1 be a uniformly and independently distributed random variable. f(x) is the
polynomial m1+m2x+ k1x2. Note that the share stored by any single party is independent of the secret because it is padded
by k1, and that the secret can be decoded from the shares stored by any three parties by polynomial interpolation.
bandwidth when exactly d parties participate in decoding, and
designs a perfect scheme that achieves the lower bound. The
field size of the scheme is slightly improved in [27]. However,
two interesting and important problems remain open: 1) the
schemes in [23], [27] achieve the lower bound on decoding
bandwidth when the number of available parties d equals a
single specific value, and do not achieve the bound if d takes
other values. This raises the question whether the lower bound
is uniformly tight, or in other words, if it is possible to design
a single scheme that achieves the lower bound universally
for all d in the range of [n − r, n]. 2) The results in [23],
[27] target the case of perfect secret sharing schemes, i.e.,
the case of z + r = n − 1. It is well known that for this
case the size of each share is at least as large as the size
of the secret [21], [7], and so the rate of the scheme is at
most 1/n. This raises the question of how to generalize the
results and ideas to the case of z + r ≤ n − 1, so that
the parameters and rate of the schemes are more flexible.
Both problems are of practical importance as the first problem
addresses the flexibility of a scheme in terms of decoding,
and the second problem addresses the high-rate case which
is a typical requirement in many practical applications such
as distributed storage. In this paper we settle both problems
and construct (perfect and ramp) schemes of flexible rate that
achieve the optimal decoding bandwidth universally. Similar
to Shamir’s scheme, our schemes are computationally efficient
and have optimal space efficiency.
A. Motivating Example
Consider Shamir’s ramp scheme in the example of Figure
1, that stores 2 symbols securely and reliably for the setting
n = 7, r = 4 and z = 1. In order to decode the secret, a user
needs to download 3 symbols from any 3 parties, and therefore
the decoding bandwidth is 3 symbols. Now suppose the same
scheme is repeated 3 times in order to store a secret of 6
symbols, as shown in Figure 2a. Then to decode the secret,
the decoding bandwidth is 9 symbols.
We propose a new scheme in Figure 2b that also stores
a secret of 6 symbols for the same setting, using the same
amount of storage space, and over the same field size. In this
scheme, if any 3 parties are available, then similar to Shamir’s
scheme, the secret can be decoded from the 9 symbols stored
by the three parties. However, if any 4 parties are available,
then the secret can be decoded by downloading 2 symbols
from each available party. Therefore, the decoding bandwidth
is improved to 8 symbols. If all 7 parties are available, then
the secret can be decoded by downloading only 1 symbol from
each party and so the decoding bandwidth is further reduced
to 7 symbols.
We use the examples in Figure 2 to highlight several ideas
to reduce the decoding bandwidth. Firstly, the amount of
communication depends on the number of available parties. In
fact the necessary amount of communication decreases strictly
as the number of available parties increases. Secondly, it is
important to distribute multiple subshares (symbols) to a party
(essentially using the ideas of array codes [6], [5]). In contrast,
Shamir’s scheme only distributes one symbol to each party
except for trivial repetitions. Thirdly, during decoding it is not
always necessary to download the complete share stored by a
party. In general, a party can preprocess its share and the user
can download a function of the share.
Comparing to the schemes in [23], [27], the scheme in the
example is improved and generalized in the following aspects.
1) The proposed scheme achieves the optimal bandwidth more
flexibly. Specifically, the schemes in [23], [27] achieve the
optimal bandwidth for a single specific number of available
parties. The proposed scheme can be designed to allow flexi-
bility in the number of available parties d. In the example of
Figure 2b the scheme achieves the optimal bandwidth when
d = 3, 4, 7. In general, we can construct schemes that achieve
the optimal bandwidth for all n−r ≤ d ≤ n. 2) The proposed
scheme is more flexible in rate. Specifically, the (perfect)
schemes in [23], [27] have rate exactly 1/n. The proposed
scheme in the example has rate 2/7 > 1/n = 1/7. In general,
we can construct schemes of arbitrary rate.
We also remark on an interesting analog between commu-
nication efficient secret sharing and the well-studied subject
of regenerating codes [8], [22], [16]. Consider a regenerating
code of length n that is able to correct r > 1 erasures. If
only one erasure occurs, then compared to repairing from a
minimum set of n − r nodes, repairing from all the n − 1
available nodes will significantly reduce the total amount of
communication that occurs during the repair. In this sense, for
both regenerating codes and communication efficient secret
sharing, a key idea is to involve more available nodes/parties
than the minimum required set during repair/decoding, for the
purpose of reducing the repair/decoding bandwidth.
B. Results
In Section III, we prove a tight information-theoretic lower
bound on the decoding bandwidth, given a set of available
parties I ⊂ {1, ..., n}. The bound implies that the decoding
bandwidth decreases as |I| increases. The lower bound applies
to both perfect and ramp schemes and generalizes the lower
bound in [23]. Particularly, we show that the overhead in
communication for the case of |I| = n is only a fraction
(n − r − z)/(n − z) of the communication overhead when
|I| = n− r.
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Party 1 Party 2 Party 3 Party 4 Party 5 Party 6 Party 7
m1 +m2 + k1 m1 + 2m2 + 4k1 m1 + 3m2 + 9k1 m1 + 4m2 + 5k1 m1 + 5m2 + 3k1 m1 + 6m2 + 3k1 m1 + 7m2 + 5k1
m3 +m4 + k2 m3 + 2m4 + 4k2 m3 + 3m4 + 9k2 m3 + 4m4 + 5k2 m3 + 5m4 + 3k2 m3 + 6m4 + 3k2 m3 + 7m4 + 5k2
m5 +m6 + k3 m5 + 2m6 + 4k3 m5 + 3m6 + 9k3 m5 + 4m6 + 5k3 m5 + 5m6 + 3k3 m5 + 6m6 + 3k3 m5 + 7m6 + 5k3
(a) Shamir’s Scheme
Party 1 · · · Party 7
f(1) = k1 +m1 +m2 +m3 +m4 +m5 +m6 · · · f(7) = k1 + 7m1 + 5m2 + 2m3 + 3m4 + 10m5 + 6m6
g(1) = k2 +m4 +m5 +m6 · · · g(7) = k2 + 7m4 + 5m5 + 2m6
h(1) = k3 +m3 +m6 · · · h(7) = k3 + 7m3 + 5m6
(b) Proposed Scheme
Fig. 2: Two secret sharing schemes for n = 7, r = 4 and z = 1 over F11. Both schemes store a secret of six symbols (m1, ...,
m6). In both schemes, k1, k2, k3 are i.i.d. uniformly distributed random variables. Scheme (a) is Shamir’s scheme (see Figure 1)
repeated three times. In scheme (b), f(x) = k1+m1x+m2x2+m3x3+m4x4+m5x5+m6x6, g(x) = k2+m4x+m5x2+m6x3,
h(x) = k3 +m3x +m6x
2, and party i stores evaluations f(i), g(i) and h(i). Note that in (b), if all 7 parties are available,
then the secret can be decoded by downloading only one symbol f(i) from each party i, and then interpolating f(x). If any
4 parties are available, then the secret can be decoded in the following way. Download two symbols f(i), g(i) from each
available party i and first interpolate g(x), implying that all coefficients of f(x) of degree larger than 3 are decoded. The
remaining unknown part of f(x) is a degree-3 polynomial and so we have enough evaluations of f(x) to interpolate it, hence
completely decoding the secret. Similarly, if any 3 parties are available, then the secret can be decoded in the following way.
Download all three symbols f(i), g(i), h(i) from each available node i and interpolate h(x), which decodes the degree-3
coefficients of f(x) and g(x). Hence the remaining unknown part of g(x) is a degree-2 polynomial and can be interpolated,
which decodes the coefficients of f(x) of degrees 4, 5, 6. Hence the remaining unknown part of f(x) is a degree-2 polynomial
and can be interpolated, decoding the complete secret. This shows that the scheme meets the reliability requirement. In fact,
for d = 3, 4, 7, scheme (b) achieves the optimal decoding bandwidth when d parties participate in decoding. The secrecy of
the scheme derives from the secrecy of Shamir’s scheme, as each polynomials f(x), g(x) and h(x) individually is an instance
of Shamir’s scheme, and we show that combining them still meets the secrecy requirement. The construction is discussed in
detail in Section IV.
In Section IV, we construct efficient secret sharing schemes
using the ideas described in Section I-A. Our construction
utilizes Shamir’s scheme and achieves the optimal decoding
bandwidth universally for all I ∈ A. Additionally, the con-
struction preserves the simplicity of Shamir’s scheme and is
efficient in terms of both space and computation. Specifically,
the scheme achieves optimal space efficiency, and requires the
same field size as Shamir’s scheme. Encoding and decoding
the scheme is also similar to encoding and decoding Shamir’s
scheme. The scheme shows that our lower bound in Section III
is uniformly tight. Interestingly, the scheme also generalizes
the construction in a recent independent work [2]. However,
the flexibility of our framework allows improved efficiency in
terms of computation, decoding delay and partial decoding.
In Section V, we construct another secret sharing scheme
from Reed-Solomon codes. The scheme achieves the optimal
decoding bandwidth when |I| = n and |I| = n − r. The
decoder of the scheme has a simpler structure compared to the
decoder of the previous scheme, and therefore is advantageous
in terms of implementation. The scheme also offers a stronger
level of reliability in that it allows decoding even if more than
r shares are partially lost.
Finally, in the application of storage where each party is
regarded as a disk, it is desirable to optimize the efficiency of
disk operations. Our lower bound on the decoding bandwidth
is naturally a lower bound on the number of symbol-reads
from disks during decoding. In all of our schemes, the number
of symbol-reads during decoding equals to the amount of
communication. Therefore, our schemes are also optimal in
terms of disk operations. In addition, by involving more than
the minimum number of disks for decoding, our schemes
balance the load at the disks and achieve a higher degree of
parallelization.
II. SECRET SHARING SCHEMES
Consider the problem of storing a secret message m
securely and reliably into n shares, so that 1) m can be
recovered from any n − r shares, and 2) any z shares do
not reveal any information about m, i.e., they are statistically
independent. Such a scheme is called a threshold secret sharing
scheme, defined formally as follows. Let Q be a general Q-
ary alphabet, i.e., |Q| = Q. Denote by [n] = {1, ..., n}. For
any index set I ⊂ [n] and a vector c = (c1, ..., cn), denote by
cI = (ci)i∈I .
Definition 1. An (n, k, r, z)Q secret sharing scheme consists
of a randomized encoding function F that maps a secret m ∈
Qk to c = (c1, ..., cn) = F (m) ∈ Qn, such that
1) (Reliability) The secret m can be decoded from any
n − r shares (entries) of c. This guarantees that m is
recoverable in the loss of any r shares. Formally,
H(m|cI) = 0, ∀I ⊂ [n], |I| = n− r. (1)
Therefore for any I ⊂ [n], |I| = n − r, there exists a
decoding function D∗I : Qn−r → Qk such that D∗I (cI) =
m.
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2) (Secrecy) Any z shares of c do not reveal any information
about m. This guarantees that m is secure if any z shares
are exposed to an eavesdropper. Formally,
H(m|cI) = H(m), ∀I ⊂ [n], |I| = z. (2)
Define the rate of a scheme to be k/n, which measures
the space efficiency. The following proposition gives an upper
bound on the rate.
Proposition 1. For any (n, k, r, z)Q secret sharing scheme, it
follows that
k ≤ n− r − z, (3)
and so the rate of the scheme is at most n−r−zn .
Proof. Let the message m be uniformly distributed, then
k = H(m) = H(m|c[z]) (4)
≤ H(m, c[n−r]|c[z])
= H(m|c[n−r], c[z]) +H(c[n−r]|c[z]) (5)
= H(c[n−r]|c[z]) (6)
= H(c{z+1,...,n−r}) ≤ n− r − z,
where (4) follows from the security requirement, (5) follows
from the chain rule, and (6) follows from the reliability
requirement.
A secret sharing scheme is rate-optimal if it achieves
equality in (3). Note that the scheme is a perfect scheme if
z = n− r − 1 and is a ramp scheme otherwise. Rate-optimal
perfect secret sharing schemes are studied in the seminal work
by Shamir [20], and are later generalized to ramp schemes [4],
[24], [9]. Note that by (3) the rate of any perfect scheme is at
most 1/n as k = 1. Any scheme of a higher rate is necessarily
a ramp scheme.
III. LOWER BOUND ON COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD
Suppose that the n shares of the secret are stored by n
parties or distributed storage nodes1, and a user wants to
decode the secret. By Definition 1, the user can connect to any
n− r nodes and download one share, i.e., one Q-ary symbol,
from each node. Therefore, by communicating n−r symbols,
the user can decode a secret of k ≤ n − r − z symbols. It
is clear that a communication overhead of z symbols occurs
during decoding. The question is, whether it is possible to
reduce the communication overhead. We answer this question
affirmatively in the remaining part of the paper.
There are two key ideas for improving the communication
overhead. Firstly, in many practical scenarios and particularly
in distributed storage systems, often time more than n − r
nodes are available. In this case, it is not necessary to restrict
the user to download from only n − r nodes. Secondly, it is
not necessary to download the complete share stored by the
node. Instead, it may suffice to communicate only a part of the
share or, in general, a function of the share. In other words,
a node can preprocess its share before transmitting it to the
user.
1In what follows we do not distinguish between parties and nodes.
Motivated by these ideas, for any I ⊂ [n], |I| ≥ n − r,
define a class of preprocessing functions EI,i : Q → SI,i,
where |SI,i| ≤ |Q|, that maps ci to eI,i = EI,i(ci). Let
eI = (eI,i)i∈I , and define a class of decoding functions
DI :
∏
i∈I SI,i → Qk, such that DI(eI) = m. For a naive
example, consider any I such that |I| = n − r. Then for
i ∈ I , we can let SI,i = Q, let EI,i be the identity function,
and let DI be the naive decoding function D∗I described in
Definition 1. In the remaining paper, when I is clear from
the context, we will suppress it in the subscripts of SI,i, EI,i,
eI,i and eI , and denote them by Si, Ei, ei and e instead. We
now formally define the notion of communication overhead in
decoding. Note that all log functions in the paper are base Q.
Definition 2. For any I such that |I| ≥ n − r, de-
fine the communication overhead function to be CO(I) =∑
i∈I log |SI,i| − k. Namely, CO(I) is the amount of extra
information, measured in Q-ary symbols, that one needs
to communicate in order to decode a secret of k symbols,
provided that the set of available shares is indexed by I .
The following result provides a lower bound on the com-
munication overhead function. It generalizes the lower bound
in [23] for perfect schemes, i.e., schemes with z+ r = n− 1.
Theorem 1. For any (n, k, r, z)Q secret sharing scheme
with preprocessing functions {EI,i}i∈I,|I|≥n−r and decoding
functions {DI}|I|≥n−r, it follows that
CO(I) ≥ kz|I| − z . (7)
Proof. Consider arbitrary I = {i1, ..., i|I|} such that |I| ≥
n− r. Assume without loss of generality that |Si1 | ≤ |Si2 | ≤
... ≤ |Si|I| |. Recall that eI = (ei1 , ..., ei|I|) is the output of
the preprocessing functions.
H(ei1 , ..., ei|I|−z )
(a)
≥ H(ei1 , ..., ei|I|−z |ei|I|−z+1 , ..., ei|I|)
(b)
= H(ei1 , ..., ei|I|−z |ei|I|−z+1 , ..., ei|I|)
+H(m|ei1 , ..., ei|I|)
(c)
= H(m, ei1 , ..., ei|I|−z |ei|I|−z+1 , ..., ei|I|)
≥ H(m|ei|I|−z+1 , ..., ei|I|)
(d)
= H(m) = k, (8)
where (a) follows from conditioning reduces entropy, (b)
follows from (1), (c) follows form the chain rule, and (d)
follows from (2). Therefore it follows from (8) that
|I|−z∏
j=1
|Sij | ≥ QH(ei1 ,...,ei|I|−z ) ≥ Qk,
and so
|I|−z∑
j=1
log |Sij | ≥ k. (9)
It then follows from |Si1 | ≤ ... ≤ |Si|I| | that,
log |Si|I|−z | ≥
k
|I| − z ,
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and that,
log |Si|I|−z+j | ≥ log |Si|I|−z | ≥
k
|I| − z , j = 1, ..., z.
(10)
Combining (9) and (10) we have,
CO(I) =
|I|∑
j=1
log |Sij | − k ≥
kz
|I| − z .
The decoding bandwidth is defined to be the total amount
of Q-ary symbols the user downloads from the nodes, which
equals CO(I)+k. Theorem 1 suggests that the communication
overhead and the decoding bandwidth decrease as the number
of available nodes increases.
For rate-optimal schemes, Theorem 1 implies that if |I| =
n − r, then the communication overhead is at least z, i.e.,
the user needs to download the complete share from each
available node. The naive decoding function D∗I in Definition
1 trivially achieves this bound. The more interesting scenario is
the regime that |I| > n−r. In this case, if (7) is tight, then one
can achieve a non-trivial improvement on decoding bandwidth
compared to the naive decoder D∗I . When k = n− r− z = 1
(i.e., for perfect schemes) and fixing any d > n − r, [23]
constructs a rate-optimal scheme that achieves the lower bound
(7) for any I such that |I| = d. However, several interesting
and important questions remain open. Firstly, is the lower
bound uniformly tight, or in other words, is it possible to
construct a scheme that achieves (7) universally for any I such
that |I| ≥ n−r (note that the scheme in [23] does not achieve
the lower bound when |I| 6= d)? Secondly, is the bound tight
when k > 1 (i.e., for ramp schemes) and how can we design
such schemes? We answer these questions in the following
section.
IV. CONSTRUCTION FROM SHAMIR’S SCHEME
In this section we construct a rate-optimal scheme that
achieves the optimal decoding bandwidth universally for all
possible I , i.e., all sets of available nodes. This implies that
the lower bound in Theorem 1 is uniformly tight. The scheme
is based on a generalization of Shamir’s scheme and preserves
its simplicity and efficiency. The scheme is flexible in the
parameters n, k, r, z and hence is flexible in rate.
We first refer the readers to Figure 2b for an example
of the scheme, and use it to describe the general idea of
the construction. To construct a scheme that achieves the
optimal decoding bandwidth when d nodes are available, for
all d ∈ D, we design a set of polynomials of different
degrees. Particularly, for all d ∈ D, we design a number of
polynomials of degree exactly d− 1, and store one evaluation
of each polynomial at each node. For each polynomial, exactly
z of its coefficients are independent keys in order to meet
the secrecy requirement. The remaining coefficients encode
“information”: for the highest-degree (e.g., degree dmax − 1,
where dmax = maxd∈D d) polynomials, their coefficients
encode the entire message; for other polynomials, say g(x),
the information encoded in the coefficients of g(x) is the
high-degree coefficients of the polynomials of degree higher
than g(x). Such an arrangement of the coefficients enables
decoding in a successive manner. Consider decoding when
d nodes are available, implying that d evaluations of each
polynomial are known and hence all polynomials of degree
d − 1 can be interpolated. Then, roughly speaking, the ar-
rangement ensures that the high-degree coefficients of some
higher-degree polynomials are known, so that the remaining
unknown parts of these polynomials can be interpolated. This
in turn allows to decode coefficients for additional high-
degree polynomials and thus to interpolate them. The chain
continues until all polynomials of degree higher than d−1 are
interpolated, implying that the message is decoded. Note that
no polynomials of degree smaller than d− 1 are interpolated,
and therefore the keys associated with them are not decoded.
This leads to the saving in decoding bandwidth and in fact
this amount is the best one can expect to save, so that the
scheme achieves the optimal bandwidth. Below we describe
the scheme formally.
A. Encoding
Consider arbitrary parameters n, r, z, D and let k = n −
r − z. We assume that n − r ∈ D since it is implied by the
reliability requirement. Choose any prime power q > n, the
scheme is Fq-linear over share alphabet Q = Fbq , where b is
the number of (Fq) symbols stored by each node. The message
m is a vector over Fq of length |m| = kb. The choice of b is
determined by D in the following way. Let |m| be the least
common multiple of {d−z : d ∈ D}, i.e., the smallest positive
integer that is divisible by all elements of the set. Note that
indeed |m| is a multiple of k = n−r−z, and we let b = |m|k .
This is the smallest choice of |m| (and thus b) that ensures
when d ∈ D nodes are available, that the optimal bandwidth,
measured by the number of Fq symbols, is an integer.
We now construct b polynomials over Fq , evaluate each
of them at n non-zero points, and let every node stores an
evaluation of each polynomial. Let D = {d1, d2, ..., d|D|},
such that n ≥ d1 > d2 > ... > d|D| = n− r. For i ∈ |D|, let
pi =
{ |m|
d1−z i = 1|m|
di−z −
|m|
di−1−z i > 1
(11)
We construct pi polynomials of degree di − 1. For all poly-
nomials, their z lowest-degree coefficients are independent
random keys. We next define the remaining di − z non-
key coefficients. We first define them for the highest degree
polynomials, and then recursively define them for the lower
degree polynomials. For i = 1, the non-key coefficients of
the polynomials of degree di − 1 are message symbols. Note
that there are |m| message symbols and |m|d1−z polynomials
of degree d1 − 1. Each such polynomial has d1 − z non-
key coefficients and so there are exactly enough coefficients
to encode the message symbols. For i > 1, the non-key
coefficients encode the degree di to di−1 − 1 coefficients of
all higher (than di − 1) degree polynomials. Note that there
are
∑i−1
j=1 pj =
|m|
di−1−z higher degree polynomials and so the
total number of coefficients to encode is (di−1 − di) |m|di−1−z .
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On the other hand, there are pi polynomials of degree di− 1,
each of them has di− z non-key coefficients, and so the total
number of non-key coefficients is (di − z)
(
|m|
di−z −
|m|
di−1−z
)
.
It is trivial to verify that the two numbers are equal and so
there is exactly enough coefficients to encode. Note that the
specific way to map the coefficients is not important and any
1-1 mapping suffices. Finally, evaluate each polynomial at n
non-zero points and store an evaluation of each polynomial at
each node. This completes the scheme. Note that indeed the
total number of polynomials is
∑|D|
i=1 pi =
|m|
d|D|−z =
|m|
k = b,
implying that the scheme is rate-optimal.
B. Decoding
For any di ∈ D, we describe the decoding algorithm of the
scheme when di nodes are available. It achieves the optimal
decoding bandwidth, and since d|D| = n−r it implies that the
scheme meets the reliability requirement. We first interpolate
all polynomials of degree di−1. After that for all polynomials
of degree di−1 − 1, their coefficients of degree larger than
di − 1 are known (as they are encoded in the coefficients
of the polynomials of degree di − 1) and so they can be
interpolated. In general, for j ≤ i, once the polynomials of
degree between dj−1 and di−1 are interpolated, then for the
polynomials of degree dj−1 − 1, their coefficients of degree
larger than di − 1 are known by construction and so they
can be interpolated. Therefore we can successively interpolate
the polynomials of higher degree until the polynomials of
degree d1 − 1 are interpolated and so the message symbols
are decoded. The total number of Fq symbols communicated is
di
∑i
j=1 pj = di
|m|
di−z . By Theorem 1, the decoding bandwidth
is at least
|m|+ kbz
di − z = kb+
kbz
di − z = kb
(
1 +
z
di − z
)
=
di|m|
di − z
Fq symbols. Therefore the optimal bandwidth is achieved.
C. Secrecy
We show that the scheme is secure against z eavesdropping
nodes. At a high level, each polynomial individually can
be viewed as a generalized Shamir’s scheme, and so each
polynomial individually is secure. The main idea is to show
that if these polynomials are combined, the resulting scheme
is still secure. We first prove that the generalized Shamir’s
scheme is indeed a valid secret sharing scheme and so is
secure.
Theorem 2. The following is an (n, n − r − z, r, z) rate-
optimal secret sharing scheme: For q > n, let m1, ...,mn−z−r
be message symbols over Fq . Construct a polynomial f(x) of
degree n− r−1 over Fq , whose degree 0 to z−1 coefficients
are random keys, and the degree z to n−r−1 coefficients are
m1 to mn−r−z . Evaluate f(x) at n distinct non-zero points
and assign one evaluation to each party.
Proof. We will prove the theorem assuming a slightly more
general f(x). Specifically, we allow f(x) to be any degree-
(n − r − 1) polynomial such that z of its coefficients of
consecutive degrees are random keys, and the remaining
coefficients are m1 to mn−r−z . Such a scheme generalizes
Shamir’s scheme as a special case when n−r−z = 1 and the
message m1 is set to be the constant coefficient. The proof
below also follows the same line as the proof of Shamir’s
scheme [20].
The scheme is reliable because f(x) can be interpolated
from any n− r evaluations so that the message symbols can
be decoded. To prove the secrecy of the scheme, suppose that
the degree i to i+ z− 1 coefficients of f(x) are random keys
k1, ..., kz , and that an adversary observes C1, ..., Cz , which are
the evaluations of f(x) at z points x1, ..., xz . Then for every
candidate value of the message symbols (m′1, ...,m
′
n−r−z),
there is one and only one candidate value of the keys
(k′1, ..., k
′
z) such that the evaluation of the corresponding
polynomial meets the observation of the adversary. This is
because given (m′1, ...,m
′
n−r−z) and C1, ..., Cz , one knows z
evaluations of the polynomial k′1x
i+k′2x
i+1+ ...+k′zx
i+z−1,
denoted by D1, ..., Dz . Then by dividing Dj by xij , j ∈ [z],
z evaluations of the polynomial k′1 + k
′
2x + ... + k
′
zx
z−1
are known. Therefore the unique (k′1, ..., k
′
z) are obtained by
interpolating this degree-(z− 1) polynomial. By construction,
since every value of the keys are equally likely, the adversary
cannot deduce any information about the message.
The following lemma shows that combining two secure
schemes is still secure as long as the keys used in the schemes
meet certain independence condition.
Lemma 1. Consider random variables M1, M2, K1, K2 such
that K2 is independent of {M1,K1}. For i = 1, 2 Let Fi be
a deterministic function of Mi,Ki. If I(M1;F1) = 0 and
I(M2;F2) = 0, then I(M1;F1, F2) = 0. In addition, if K1 is
independent of M2, then I(M1,M2;F1, F2) = 0.
Proof. We start with the first statement. Since F2 is a function
of K2,M2 but K2 is independent of {M1,K1, F1}, it follows
that F2 is independent of {M1,K1, F1} conditioning on M2,
implying the Markov chain {M1,K1, F1} → M2 → F2.
Therefore, I(M1,K1, F1,M2;F2) = I(M2;F2) = 0,
i.e., F2 and {M1,K1, F1,M2} are independent. Hence
I(M1;F1, F2) = I(M1;F2) + I(M1;F1|F2) (a)=
I(M1;F1|F2) (b)= I(M1;F1) = 0, where (a) and (b)
follows from the fact that F2 is independent from {M1, F1}.
To prove the second statement, note that since K1 is
independent of M2 and that F1 is a function of M1,K1,
we have the Markov Chain M2 → M1 → F1, by which
it follows that I(M1,M2;F1) = I(M1;F1) = 0. Simi-
larly because K2 is independent of {M1,K1, F1} and that
F2 is a function of M2,K2, we have the Markov Chain
{M1, F1} → M2 → F2. By this chain it follows that
I(M1, F1,M2;F2) = I(M2;F2) = 0, i.e., {M1, F1,M2} is
independent of F2. Therefore I(M1,M2;F2|F1) = 0 and so
I(M1,M2;F1, F2) = I(M1,M2;F1) + I(M1,M2;F2|F1) =
0.
Suppose that the adversary compromises z nodes and ob-
tains z evaluations of each polynomial. Consider the i-th
polynomial in the order that we define them, let fi denote
the adversary’s observation of this polynomial, let ki denote
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the key coefficients of this polynomial and let mi denote the
non-key coefficients. By Theorem 2 we have
I(mi;fi) = 0, i = 1, ..., b. (12)
Consider the first p1 polynomials which are polynomials
of the highest degree d1 − 1. By construction, m1, ...,mp1
exactly encode the message m. We invoke Lemma 1 by
regarding m1,k1, f1,m2,k2 and f2 as M1,K1, F1,M2,K2
and F2. By the second statement of the lemma it follows that
I(m1,m2;f1,f2) = 0. Inductively, for 1 < i < p1, suppose
that I(m1, ...,mi;f1, ...,fi) = 0. We regard {m1, ...,mi}
as M1, {k1, ...,ki} as K1, {f1, ...,fi} as F1, and regard
mi+1,ki+1,fi+1 as M2,K2, F2. It follows from Lemma 1
that I(m1, ...,mi+1;f1, ...,fi+1) = 0. By induction we have
I(m1, ...,mp1 ;f1, ...,fp1) = 0.
We then regard {m1, ...,mp1} , m as M1, {k1, ...,kp1}
as K1, {f1, ...,fp1} as F1, and regard mp1+1, kp1+1, fp1+1
as M2,K2, F2. Then it follows from the first statement of
Lemma 1 that I(m;f1, ...,fp1+1) = 0. Inductively, for
p1 < i < b, suppose that I(m;f1, ...,fi) = 0. We re-
gard m as M1, {k1, ...,ki} as K1, {f1, ...,fi} as F1, and
regard mi+1,ki+1,fi+1 as M2,K2, F2. By Lemma 1 we
have I(m;f1, ...,fi+1) = 0. By induction it follows that
I(m;f1, ...,fb) = 0, implying that the adversary learns no
information about the message m. This completes the proof
and we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Let D ⊂ {n − r, n − r + 1, ..., n}, the en-
coding scheme constructed in Section IV-A is a rate-optimal
(n, k, r, z) secret sharing scheme. The scheme achieves the
optimal decoding bandwidth when d nodes participate in
decoding, universally for all d ∈ D.
D. Discussion
We remark on some other important advantages and proper-
ties of our construction. Firstly, the scheme also achieves the
optimal number of symbol-reads from disks in decoding. To
see this, notice that the lower bound (7) on communication
overhead is also a lower bound on the number of Q-ary
symbols that need to be read from disks during decoding. The
number of symbol-reads in the proposed scheme equals to the
amount of communication. Therefore our scheme achieves the
lower bound and hence is optimal. Secondly, compared to most
existing schemes which decode from the minimum number of
n−r−z nodes, our scheme allows all available nodes (or more
flexibly, any d ∈ D nodes) to participate in decoding and hence
can help balance the load at the disks and achieves a higher
degree of parallelization. Thirdly, the encoding and decoding
of the scheme are similar to that of Shamir’s scheme and
therefore are efficient and practical. Particularly, the scheme
works over the same field as Shamir’s scheme. Fourthly, the
preprocessing functions only rely on d = |I| instead of I ,
further simplifying implementation. Fifthly, in practice when
a user connects to more nodes, the increased latency may offset
the benefit of the reduced bandwidth. One can overcome this
issue by avoiding connections to nodes of large latency. If the
latency of the nodes are not known a prior, one can start with
connecting to all nodes and downloading the evaluations of the
polynomials in decreasing order of degrees. If some nodes do
not respond in time, consider them as not available and switch
adaptively to the mode of decoding from a smaller number of
nodes. Finally, the construction is flexible in the parameters,
i.e., it works for arbitrary values of n, r and z and D.
Connection to other schemes: An important idea in our
scheme is to construct multiple correlated polynomials of
different degrees in order to facilitate decoding when different
number of nodes are available. Similar ideas also appear in
the schemes in [23], [27]. The main technique that enables
the improvement of our schemes is a more careful and flexible
design of the numbers and degrees of the polynomials, as well
as the arrangement of their coefficients.
Our scheme maps the high-degree coefficients of the higher
degree polynomials into the coefficients of the lower degree
polynomials, whereas the specific coefficient mapping is not
important and any 1-1 mapping suffices. Additionally, for all
polynomials in our scheme, the z lowest degree coefficients are
independent keys. However, in general this is not necessary: in
any polynomial, we can choose any consecutive z coefficients
to be independent keys, and use the remaining coefficients to
encode information (i.e., message symbols and coefficients of
higher degree polynomials). The resulting scheme is a still
valid (see the proof of Theorem 2) and achieves the optimal
decoding bandwidth universally. Under this observation, we
note that our scheme generalizes the scheme in a recent
independent work [2]. Particularly, our scheme is equivalent to
the scheme in [2] if we require a specific coefficient mapping
and let the z highest (instead of lowest) coefficients of all
polynomial to be keys2. Refer to the Appendix for more
discussion on the connection, where we interpret an example
of the scheme in [2] under our framework.
In what follows we discuss the the advantage of our frame-
work which allows the flexibility in choosing the coefficient
mapping and the positions of the keys in a polynomial.
Coefficient mapping: As discussed above we can choose
the coefficient mapping to be any 1-1 mapping. The flexibility
in choosing the specific mapping is helpful in practice. Partic-
ularly, it is possible to improve the (computational) encoding
complexity of the scheme substantially by choosing a mapping
that maintains the order of the coefficients. Refer to Figure 2b
for an example. We need to compute m4x+m5x2+m6x3 in
evaluating g(x), and we can reuse this computation in evaluat-
ing f(x), because f(x) contains the same run of consecutive
coefficients m4x4+m5x5+m6x6. This for example will save
2 multiplications and 2 additions.
Arrangement of keys: We remark that choosing the lowest
degree coefficients to be keys has several practical advantages.
Decoding the scheme involves sequentially interpolating the
polynomials through multiple iterations, which can lead to
undesirable delay especially when |D| is large. To mitigate
this issue, we wish to decode the message symbols “on the
fly” in each iteration. Specifically, if d nodes are available,
then each time a polynomial is interpolated, exactly d new
message and/or key symbols are decoded. Since the number
2The scheme in [2] also lets a node evaluate all polynomials at the same
point, whereas this is not necessary in our framework.
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of symbols decoded in each interpolation, the total number of
message symbols and the total number of key symbols to be
decoded, are all fixed there is a trade-off between the decoding
order of the key and message symbols. The location of keys
in the polynomials plays a crucial role in this trade-off.
Formally, let β(i) be the number of message symbols de-
coded after i iterations, i.e., after i polynomial interpolations.
The optimal trade-off is to maximize β(i) for every i. We
first derive a simple upper bound of β(i). Note that by the
time that i polynomials have been interpolated, di symbols
are decoded and among them there are at least zi keys since
each polynomial introduces z independent keys for secrecy.
Therefore β(i) ≤ (d− z)i.
Our scheme achieves this upper bound for all i. For ex-
ample, in Figure 2b, if d = 3 nodes are available, then
decoding involves 3 iterations and each iteration outputs
d − z = 2 message symbols. In general, each iteration in
decoding our scheme outputs d − z message symbols. This
is because by construction, only coefficients of degree higher
than d|D| = n − r > z will be mapped to the coefficients of
the lower degree polynomials. Since we place the keys in the
z lowest degree coefficients, they are never mapped. Therefore
for any polynomial, its coefficients of degree larger than z−1
encode message symbols. When a polynomial is interpolated,
exactly z keys are decoded and the remaining d− z symbols
decoded are message symbols.
Achieving β(i) = (d − z)i implies that at any moment
during the decoding process, our scheme always decodes
the maximum number of message symbols. In other words
the decoding delay, measured in the number of iterations,
averaged over all message symbols, is minimized. Moreover,
the fact that each iteration decodes a fixed number of d − z
new message symbols may be helpful for implementation.
On the other hand, note that choosing the z highest degree
coefficients to be keys implies that the keys will be mapped to
the coefficients of lower degree polynomials. Hence the keys
will be decoded earlier than necessary (since lower degree
polynomials are interpolated earlier) and it is not possible to
achieve the optimal trade-off. Consider the example in Figure
2b, if we switch the keys to high degree coefficients, then
the polynomials are f(x) = m1 + m2x + m3x2 + m4x3 +
m5x
4 + m6x
5 + k1x
6, g(x) = m5 + m6x + k1x2 + k2x3
and h(x) = m4 + k2x + k3x2. In the case that d = 4 nodes
are available, only 2 message symbols m5,m6 are decoded
in the first iteration and the remaining 4 message symbols
are decoded in the second (last) iteration. In comparison,
the original scheme performs better by decoding 3 message
symbols in each iteration. Finally, we remark that decoding
the maximum number of message symbols on the fly is also
beneficial in terms of partial decoding, i.e., decoding a subset
of message symbols. In this case decoding can finish early if
all symbols of interest are decoded, and our scheme maximizes
the chance of finishing early.
Finally, we remark that using the random coding argument,
we can design another secret sharing scheme that achieves the
optimal decoding bandwidth universally [10]. However, such
a scheme requires a significantly lager field size.
V. CONSTRUCTION FROM REED-SOLOMON CODES
In this section we present another rate-optimal secret sharing
scheme that achieves the optimal decoding bandwidth when all
n nodes are available. The scheme is flexible in the parameters
and hence is flexible in rate. The scheme is directly related
to Reed-Solomon codes. Particularly, the encoding matrix of
the scheme is a generator matrix of Reed-Solomon codes,
and so the scheme can be decoded as Reed-Solomon codes.
This is an advantage over the scheme in the previous section,
which requires recursive decoding. The scheme also provides
a stronger level of reliability in the sense that it allows
decoding even if more than r shares are partially erased. On
the other hand, unlike the previous scheme, this scheme does
not achieve the optimal decoding bandwidth universally, but
rather only for d = n − r and d = n. However, we remark
that the case that the n nodes are available is particularly
important because it correspond to the best case in terms of
decoding bandwidth and is arguably the most relevant case for
the application of distributed storage, where the storage nodes
are usually highly available.
A. Encoding
Fix k = n − r − z, let q > n(k + r) be a prime power,
and let the share alphabet be Q = Fk+rq . Note that each share
is a length k + r vector over Fq . For j = 1, ..., n, denote
the j-th share by cj = (c1,j , ..., ck+r,j), where ci,j ∈ Fq .
The secret message m is k symbols over Q and there-
fore can be regarded as a length-k(k + r) vector over Fq ,
denoted by (m1, ...,mk(k+r)). The encoder generates keys
k = (k1, ..., kkz) ∈ Fkzq and k′ = (k′1, ..., k′rz) ∈ Frzq
independently and uniformly at random. The encoding scheme
is linear over Fq , and is described by an encoding matrix G
over Fq:
(c1,1, ..., c1,n, ..., ck+r,1, ..., ck+r,n) =
(m1, ...,mk(k+r), k1, ..., kkz, k
′
1, ..., k
′
rz)G. (13)
Note that G has k(k+r)+kz+rz = nk+rz rows and has
n(k+r) columns. In the following we discuss the construction
of G based on a Vandermonde matrix. We start with some
notation. Let α1, ..., αn(k+r) be distinct non-zero elements of
Fq , and let vij = αi−1j , i = 1, ..., nk+ rz, j = 1, ..., n(k+ r),
then V = (vij) is a Vandermonde matrix of the same size as G.
Suppose f = (f0, ..., fi) is an arbitrary vector with entries in
Fq , we denote by f [x] the polynomial f0+f1x+...+fixi over
Fq with indeterminate x. We construct a set of polynomials
as follows:
fi[x] = x
i−1 i = 1, ..., kn, (14)
fkn+i[x] = x
i−1
kn∏
j=1
(x− αj) i = 1, ..., rz. (15)
Let fi, i = 1, ..., kn+ rz be the length-(kn+ rz) vectors over
Fq corresponding to the polynomials. Stack the fi’s to obtain
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a square matrix of size (kn+ rz):
T =
 f1...
fkn+rz

Finally, we complete the construction by setting
G = TV.
Example 1. Consider the setting that n = 3, r = 1, z = 1
and k = n − r − z = 1. Let q = 7 and Q = F2q . Then m =
(m1,m2), k = (k1) and k′ = (k′1). Construct a Vandermonde
matrix over Fq as
V =

1 1 1 1 1 1
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 4 2 2 4 1
1 1 6 1 6 6
 . (16)
Construct polynomials f1[x] = 1, f2[x] = x, f3[x] = x2 and
f4[x] = (x− 1)(x− 2)(x− 3) = 1 + 4x+ x2 + x3.
Therefore,
T =

f1
f2
f3
f4
 =

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
1 4 1 1
 ,
and the encoding matrix is given by
G = TV =

1 1 1 1 1 1
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 4 2 2 4 1
0 0 0 6 3 4
 .
The properties of G are discussed in the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Regard G as a block matrix
G =
(
G11 G12
G21 G22
)
,
where G11 has size kn× kn, G12 has size kn× rn, G21 has
size rz × kn, and G22 has size rz × rn. Then,
(i) Any (n−r)(k+r) columns of G are linearly independent.
(ii) G11 is a Vandermonde matrix.
(iii) G21 = 0.
(iv) Any rz columns of G22 are linearly independent.
Proof. By construction, the polynomials fi[x], i = 1, ..., kn+
rz have distinct degrees and therefore are linearly independent.
Therefore the rows of T are linearly independent and so T
is full rank. This implies that the row space of G is the
same as the row space of V . The row space of V is a linear
(nk + nr, nk + rz) Reed-Solomon code because that V is a
Vandermonde matrix. Note that nk + rz = (n − r)(k + r),
and so the row space of G is a (nk + nr, (n − r)(k + r))
Reed-Solomon code. This proves (i).
To prove (ii), note that by (14), the first kn rows of
G are exactly the first kn rows of V . Therefore G11 is a
Vandermonde matrix.
To prove (iii), note that by construction the (i, j)-th entry
of G21 equals fkn+i[αj ]. By (15), αj is a root of fkn+i[x],
for i = 1, ..., rz, j = 1, ..., kn. Hence G21 = 0.
Finally we prove (iv). By construction the (i, j)-th entry of
G22 equals
fkn+i[αkn+j ] = α
i−1
kn+j
kn∏
l=1
(αkn+j − αl) = αi−1kn+jf∗[αkn+j ],
(17)
where f∗[x] =
∏kn
l=1(x − αl). Since α1, ..., α(k+r)n are dis-
tinct elements, it follows that f∗[αkn+j ] 6= 0, for j = 1, ..., rn.
Let 1 ≤ j1 < j2 < ... < jrz ≤ rn and consider the submatrix
formed by the j1-th,...,jrz-th columns of G22. By (17), the l-
th column of the submatrix are formed by consecutive powers
of αkn+jl , scaled by f
∗[αkn+jl ]. Therefore the determinant
of the submatrix is
∏rz
l=1 f
∗[αkn+jl ]
∏
1≤u<v≤rz(αkn+jv −
αkn+ju) 6= 0. This shows that any rz columns of G22 are
linearly independent.
B. Decoding
We describe the decoding procedure for two cases: 1)
|I| = n, i.e., all nodes are available, and 2) |I| < n. First
consider the case that |I| = n, i.e., I = [n]. In order to
decode, for this case it suffices to read and communicate the
first k symbols over Fq from each share. Formally, the user
downloads e = (c1,1, ..., c1,n, ..., ck,1, ..., ck,n). By Lemma
2(ii), G11 is invertible. Denote the inverse of G11 by G−111 ,
then the secret can be recovered by
eG−111
(e)
= (m1, ...,mk(k+r), k1, ..., kkz),
where (e) follows from (13) and Lemma 2(iii). The decoding
process involves communicating kn symbols from Fq . The
communication overhead is kz symbols over Fq or kzk+r =
kz
n−z Q-ary symbols, which achieves the lower bound (7) and
therefore is optimal.
Next consider the case that n − r ≤ |I| < n. Select
an arbitrary subset I ′ of I of size n − r, and download
the complete share stored by the nodes in I ′. Hence, the
downloaded information e is a length-(n−r)(k+r) vector over
Fq . By Lemma 2(i), it follows that any (n−r)(k+r) columns
in G are linearly independent and therefore the submatrix
formed by these columns is invertible. The secret m can
then be recovered by multiplying e with the inverse. An
alternative way to decode the secret is to notice that G is
an encoding matrix of a (nk + nr, nk + rz) Reed-Solomon
code over Fq . Therefore one may employ the standard decoder
of Reed-Solomon code to correct any r(k + r) erasures or
br(k + r)/2c errors of symbols over Fq . Note that when
at most r nodes are unavailable, we regard their shares as
erased and there are at most r(k+r) erasures of symbols over
Fq , and therefore can be corrected. In general, any r(k + r)
erasures or br(k + r)/2c errors are correctable even if they
occur to more than r nodes. The decoding process involves
communicating nk + rz symbols of Fq . The communication
overhead is (n−r)(k+r)−k(k+r) = z(k+r) symbols over
Fq , or z symbols over Q, which achieves the lower bound (7)
if and only if |I| = n− r.
0018-9448 (c) 2016 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TIT.2016.2616144, IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory
10
C. Analysis
Theorem 4. The encoding scheme constructed in Section
V-A is a rate-optimal (n, k, r, z) secret sharing scheme. The
scheme achieves the optimal decoding bandwidth when d
nodes participate in decoding, for d = n or d = n− r.
Proof. We need to verify that the encoding scheme meets the
reliability requirement and the security requirement of a secret
sharing scheme, formally defined in Definition 1. Explicit de-
coding scheme and its communication overhead are discussed
in Section V-B and therefore the reliability requirement is met.
The scheme is rate-optimal because k = n − r − z. We only
need to show that the encoding scheme is secure. To this end,
we first show that H(k,k′|cI ,m) = 0, for all I such that
|I| = z. In other words, the random symbols generated by
the encoder are completely determined by cI and the secret.
Denote the submatrix formed by the first k(k+ r) rows of G
by Gtop and the submatrix formed by the remaining (k + r)z
rows of G by Glow. Consider any I = {i1, ..., iz}, and let
cI = (c1,i1 , ..., c1,iz , ..., ck+r,i1 , ..., ck+r,iz ). It then follows
from (13) that
cI = (m1, ...,mk(r+k))Gtop,I + (k1, ..., kkz, k
′
1, ..., k
′
rz)Glow,I ,
where Gtop,I is the submatrix formed by the subset of columns
in {i+j|i ∈ I, j = 0, n, ..., (k+r−1)n} of Gtop, and Glow,I is
the submatrix formed by the same subset of columns of Glow.
Therefore, written concisely,
(k k′)Glow,I = cI −mGtop,I . (18)
To study the rank of Glow,I , note that it is a square matrix of
size (k + r)z, and we regard it as a block matrix
Glow,I =
(
G′11 G
′
12
G′21 G
′
22
)
, (19)
where G′11 has size kz × kz, G′12 has size kz × rz, G′21 has
size rz × kz and G′22 has size rz × rz. By Lemma 2(ii),
G′11 is a block of a Vandermonde matrix and therefore is
invertible. By Lemma 2.(iii), G′21 = 0. Denote cI −mGtop,I
by (u1, ..., u(k+r)z), then the above two facts together with
(18) imply that
k = (u1, ..., ukz)G
′−1
11 (20)
Therefore k is a deterministic function of m and cI . It follows
from (18) that
k′G′22 = (ukz+1, ..., u(k+r)z)− kG′12.
By Lemma 2(iv), G′22 is invertible and therefore
k′ =
(
(ukz+1, ..., u(k+r)z)− kG′12
)
G′−122 . (21)
This shows that k′ is a deterministic function of k, cI and m,
and so
H(k,k′|cI ,m) = 0. (22)
It then follows that,
H(m)−H(m|cI) = I(m; cI)
= H(cI)−H(cI |m)
(f)
≤ z −H(cI |m)
(g)
= z −H(cI |m) +H(cI |m,k,k′)
= z − I(cI ;k,k′|m)
= z −H(k,k′|m) +H(k,k′|cI ,m)
(h)
= z −H(k,k′|m)
(i)
= z −H(k,k′)
(j)
= z − z = 0, (23)
where (f) is due to |I| = z; (g) is due to the fact that cI
is a function of m, k and k′; (h) is due to (22); (i) is due
to the fact that k,k′ are independent of m; and (j) follows
from the fact that k,k′ are uniformly distributed. Therefore
H(m) = H(m|cI) and the security requirement is met. This
completes the proof that the encoding scheme is a valid secret
sharing scheme.
Theorem 4 shows that the proposed secret sharing scheme
is optimal in terms of storage usage and is optimal in terms of
best-case (i.e., |I| = n) communication overhead. Compared
to the scheme in the previous section, this scheme has advan-
tages in terms of implementation and error correction because
decoding the scheme is equivalent to decoding standard Reed-
Solomon codes. The scheme also provides a stronger level of
reliability in the sense that it allows decoding even if more than
r shares are partially erased. Similar to previous discussion,
the scheme achieves the optimal number of symbol-reads from
disks when |I| = n. Finally, in the scheme all operations
are performed over the field Fq , where q > n(k + r). This
requirement on the field size can be relaxed in the following
simple way. Let β be the greatest common divisor of k
and r, then instead of choosing Q to be Fk+rq , we can let
Q = F
k
β+
r
β
q , m = (m1, ...,m k(k+r)
β
), k = (k1, ..., k kz
β
)
and k′ = (k′1, ..., k
′
rz
β
). The resulting scheme is a rate-
optimal (n, k, r, z)Q secret sharing scheme with the same
communication overhead function as the original scheme. For
this modified construction, it is sufficient to choose any field
size q > nk+rβ .
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we study the communication efficiency of
secret sharing schemes in decoding. We prove an information-
theoretic lower bound on the amount of information to be
communicated during decoding, and show that the decoding
bandwidth decreases as d, the number of nodes that participate
in decoding, increases. We prove that the bound is uniformly
tight by designing a secret sharing scheme that achieves
the optimal decoding bandwidth universally for all valid d.
The scheme is simple and is efficient in both space and
computation. We construct another secret sharing scheme that
achieves the optimal decoding bandwidth when all nodes are
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available. The scheme has an advantage in implementation
because its codewords form the Reed-Solomon codes. In the
application of distributed storage, the proposed communication
efficient secret sharing schemes also improve disk access
efficiency. There are a number of interesting open problems:
1) in the application of distributed storage, how can one
construct codes that are communication efficient in terms of
both decoding and repair? We note that very recently, [17],
[26] have addressed this problem for certain sets of parameters.
2) how to generalize the results to other (non-threshold) access
structures? and 3) is it possible to extend the schemes and ideas
in the paper to improve the communication efficiency of other
secure protocols that use secret sharing schemes as building
blocks?
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APPENDIX
We describe a connection between our scheme in Section
IV-A and the Staircase code in [2]. Specifically, we will
interpret the Staircase code example in [2, Section 5.1] under
our framework described in Section IV-A. The general case
follows similarly.
Example of the Staircase code: In [2, Section 5.1], Bitar
and El Rouayheb describe a construction of a (n = 4, k =
1, r = 2, z = 1) rate-optimal scheme that achieves the optimal
decoding bandwidth when d nodes participate in decoding, for
d ∈ {2, 3, 4}. Specifically, the scheme is over the field F65.
Denote the message by (m1, ...,m6), where each entry is a
symbol from F5. Let k1, ..., k6 be random keys over F5. The
encoder generates a matrix
M =

m1 m4 k1 m3 m6 k3
m2 m5 k2 k4 k5 k6
m3 m6 k3 0 0 0
k1 k2 0 0 0 0

and a Vandermode matrix
V =

1 1 1 1
1 2 4 3
1 3 4 2
1 4 1 4
 .
Note that the 0’s in M form a staircase structure, hence its
name. Finally, the encoder computes C = VM , and assigns
the i-th row of C to node i as its share.
We now connect the above scheme to the one described
in Section IV-A. Let us regard each column of M as a
polynomial: f1(x) = m1 + m2x + m3x2 + k1x3; f2(x) =
m4 + m5x + m6x
2 + k2x
3; f3(x) = k1 + k2x + k3x2;
f4(x) = m3+k4x; f5(x) = m6+k5x; and f6(x) = k3+k6x.
Then multiplying the i-th row of V to the j-th column of M
is equivalent to evaluating fj(x) at x = i. Therefore, the share
assigned to node i is the evaluations of the polynomials fj(x),
j = 1, ..., 6, at x = i. Now we observe that the polynomials
fj(x)’s are consistent with the ones defined in Section IV-A:
Firstly, the degrees of the polynomials and the number of
polynomials with respect to a degree are consistent with (11).
Secondly, each polynomial introduces a new key, which is
its highest degree coefficient3, for security. Finally, the high
degree coefficients of the high degree polynomials are mapped
to the coefficients of the low degree polynomials. Specifically,
the degree-3 coefficients of f1(x) and f2(x) are mapped to the
coefficients of f3(x); and the degree-2 coefficients of f1(x),
f2(x) and f3(x) are mapped to the coefficients of f4(x), f5(x)
and f6(x).
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